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Introduction
The post-9/ 11 clash between the Executive and the Judiciary over the
constitutional limits of the war on terror has cast light into some of the
darker corners of our assumptions about the Constitution.2 In heralding a
1. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953).
t Candidate for J.D., Cornell Law School, 2007; B.A., University of Illinois-
Chicago, 1997; Managing Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 92 (ulyssessmith
iv@gmail.com). Many thanks to Professors Steven Yale-Loehr and Trevor Morrison for
their valuable comments and helpful suggestions, and to Christin Murphy, Jeff
Buchholz, and the staff of the Cornell International Law Journal for their assistance and
terrific editing. Special thanks to Sabin Willet and Wells Dixon, who represent many of
the Uighurs at Guantanamo Bay, and to all the lawyers involved in the Guantanamo
litigation, who deserve all of our thanks as they work hard to help our country live up to
its ideals.
2. Among the most startling aspects of the war on terror has been its conspicuous
presence on the docket of the U.S. Supreme Court. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). Given the highly controversial habeas-
stripping provision in last fall's Military Commissions Act of 2006, which many scholars
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new kind of warfare, 3 one that is unmoored from nineteenth-century
notions of territoriality, 4 the attacks of September 11, 2001, have chal-
lenged the U.S. Supreme Court to reach beyond traditional limits of sover-
eignty and justiciability. The Court seems to be saying that as projections
of power become less related to geography, so too should the reach of a
country's laws.5
For instance, in Rasul v. Bush,6 the Supreme Court took one of its
boldest steps to date, stirring up a maelstrom of controversy surrounding
the detention of aliens at Guantanamo Bay. In granting the Rasul petition-
ers a forum, the Court not only extended its reach into "unfamiliar" terri-
believe will end up before the Court sometime in 2007 (while the Court recently denied
cert. in the Boumediene and Al Odah cases, Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1725 (2007),
cases which, in part, challenged the constitutionality of the MCA, a statement attached
to the cert. denial byJusticesJohn Paul Stevens and Anthony Kennedy suggests that once
Petitioners exhaust available remedies this result might be different), it is likely that
more cases arising out of the post-September 11, 2001 war on terror are on the way. See
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 7(e)(1) (2006) ("No court, justice, or
judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been
determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant
or is awaiting such determination."); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Standing Up to Injus-
tice in a Crisis, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 20, 2006 (calling on "courageous judges" to
stand up against legislation that is "among the worst ever adopted in its disregard for the
Constitution"); David G. Savage, Law's Reach Extends to Jails in U.S., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2006, at A18 (reporting law scholars' predictions that the Act's partial repeal of habeas
corpus will be struck down as unconstitutional).
3. See TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE ENEMY
COMBATANT CASES ix (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005) [hereinafter TERRORISM].
4. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw (1996) (discussing "territoriality"-the extension of constitu-
tional rights up to but no further than a country's geographical boundaries-as it relates
to immigration and persons outside U.S. borders); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Jus-
tice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2546-50 (2005) (arguing that the notion that geographic
location determines legal rules makes progressively less sense in an increasingly global-
ized world).
5. This highly controversial notion, pregnant with implications, will be discussed
in greater detail in Part I.A of this Note. For now, it should be noted that the traditional
understanding of the Constitution's scope is that it is coterminous with the nation's
territorial boundaries. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[It is] an
elementary principle[ I that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its terri-
tory."), overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See Raus-
tiala, supra note 4, at 2506. The debate over the proper understanding of the
Constitution's scope, ongoing since the Alien Sedition Act of 1798, see NEUMAN, supra
note 4, at 52-53, has increased in fervor over the last several years due to the "legal black
hole" the United States has sought to create at Guantanamo Bay. See Lord Johan Steyn,
Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, Twenty-Seventh F.A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 25,
2003), available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/nov/guantanamo.pdf (last
visited Apr. 19, 2007). The question, as framed by Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2546, is
"Can the United States, a nation committed to constitutional government, . . . in fact
govern unfettered by its basic law as long as it acts outside certain spaces?" Raustiala,
supra note 4, at 2546.
6. 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (holding that the statutory writ of habeas corpus
extends to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and that federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals cap-
tured overseas).
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tory, 7 it confirmed for itself a role in policing the legality of executive
detention.8
The detention cases of the Uighurs,9 detainees of the war on terror
who remain incarcerated despite having been cleared for release,' present
a striking set of factual circumstances that urge the Court to go further
still. Unlike other enemy combatants who have been processed by the mili-
tary and cleared for release," the Uighurs are not easily "swept under the
rug."'1 2 Their situation poses difficult questions regarding the nature,
scope, and purpose of executive detention; the conditions under which
detainees may be held; and the role of the federal courts in resolving these
issues. This Note first examines the lawfulness of indefinite executive
detention in the absence of a legal justification for doing so.
Furthermore, because several Uighurs remain incarcerated despite
having been cleared for release, 13 they forcefully, and unblinkingly, stand
7. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Supreme Court and the Guantanamo Controversy in TER-
RORISM, supra note 3, at 159. Wedgwood criticizes the Court's "innovation" in Rasul-
authorizing civilian courts to review the internment of prisoners of war and irregular
combatants in overseas military operations-as an unprecedented and incautious degree
of interference with the president's war powers. Id. at 160. Apparently, a narrow major-
ity of our elected officials in Congress agree. See Military Commissions Act of 2006,
supra note 2.
8. See Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (asserting the Court's role in polic-
ing the detention of enemy combatants in the famous words: "[w]e have long since made
clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights
of the Nation's citizens. Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for
the Executive ... it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individ-
ual liberties are at stake") (citations omitted).
9. Pronounced "wee-gur." See infra Part I for a detailed background on this Muslim
Chinese community and their predicament, both in western China, where they are from,
and in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where approximately two-dozen have been detained for
nearly five years. Two of the twenty-two Uighurs captured in Afghanistan in 2001 by
Pakistani bounty hunters sued in 2005 in U.S. district court challenging their deten-
tions-detentions which continued despite a military tribunal's determination that they
were "no longer enemy combatants." Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C.
2005). See Neil A. Lewis, Freedom for Chinese Detainees Hinges on Finding a New Home-
land, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2004, at Al. These two Uighurs, along with three others, were
subsequently released to Albania, three days before their case was to go before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; the rest of the Uighurs-numbering seventeen-
remain at Guantanamo Bay. See Craig Whitlock, U.S. Faces Obstacles to Freeing Detain-
ees, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2006, at Al.
10. See infra Part I for background on the Uighurs' legal status.
11. See, for example, the case ofYaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen of Saudi descent held in
a naval brig in South Carolina for several years as an enemy combatant, who was cleared
for release, forced to renounce his citizenship, and subsequently deported. See Joel
Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American It Had Captured in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al.
12. See id.
13. See Declaration of Brigadier Gen. Jay W. Hood, Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d
198 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2005) (No. 05-0497JR) [hereinafter Hood Declaration] (on file
with author); see infra Part I.A. The situation as of December 2006 is actually more
nuanced than this suggests. Of the twenty-two Uighurs captured together in Afghani-
stan, five were determined to be "no longer enemy combatants" (NLECs) and were
released to Albania. The remaining seventeen were cleared for release by a Combatant
Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) in 2003 but nevertheless remain incarcerated. Of the
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as victims of the U.S. government's overreaching in its efforts against ter-
rorism. They are stuck in a limbo of our making. Unlike Ignatz Mezei, 1 4
from whom Justice Tom C. Clark could plausibly, if harshly, distance the
United States by stating that an alien in his position is "no more ours than
theirs,"'1 5 the Uighurs are, profoundly, our problem. This Note also pro-
vides an answer to the practical problem of what should be done with the
Uighurs, given the United States' responsibility for creating the situation in
which its detainee victims find themselves, including those still detained at
Guantanamo Bay and those in tenuous asylum in Albania. 16
Justice Robert H. Jackson began his dissent in Mezei by stating,
"[flortunately it is still startling, in this country, to find a person held
indefinitely in executive custody without accusation of crime or judicial
trial." 17 Jackson followed this statement with an opinion that struck the
balance, difficult during times of war, between respecting the government's
substantial national security interests and upholding the basic understand-
ing of civil liberties reflected in our Constitution and in our society's sense
of morality and justice.' 8 This balance should guide the Court's decisions
in war-on-terror' 9 cases and, in particular, should underlie any resolution
435 prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay, CSRTs have determined that approxi-
mately one-quarter present no security risk or are otherwise eligible for release. See
Whitlock, supra note 9.
14. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); see infra Part L.B
for detailed background. Mezei, an alien resident in the United States for 25 years,
became stranded in a temporary haven on Ellis Island for 19 months when he attempted
to return to the United States after two years abroad when the United States refused to
admit him for reasons of national security, and no other country would grant him entry.
See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209.
15. Id. at 216. ("[Tihe times being what they are, Congress may well have felt that
other countries ought not shift the onus to us; that an alien in respondent's position is
no more ours than theirs.").
16. On December 23, 2005, District of Columbia district court judge James Robert-
son ruled in Qassim v. Bush that despite the illegality of the Uighurs' detention the fed-
eral district court had no remedy for the Uighurs. Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 203. See
infra Part L.A for additional background on the lawsuit. Three days before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was to hear oral argument in the matter, the United States
deported five Uighurs-the two litigants and three others-to Albania, where they cur-
rently remain, in uncertain circumstances. See, e.g., Bruce Konviser, A Strange Kind of
Freedom, TORONTO STAR, June 13, 2006 (reporting the Albanian National Commissioner
for Refugees statement that "[The Uighurs'] future is not here .... There is not a Uighur
community [here]. They don't speak any Albanian .... There is no integration possibil-
ity for them here. We realized their future is not in Albania"); Joanne Mariner, Uighurs in
Albania, FINDLAw, May 12, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20060512.
html. Seventeen other Uighurs cleared for release, however, remain at Guantanamo Bay.
See Whitlock, supra note 9.
17. See Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 at 219 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 227 ("The Communist conspiratorial technique of infiltration poses a
problem which sorely tempts the [U.S.] Government to resort to confinement of suspects
on secret information secretly judged. I have not been one to discount the Communist
evil. But my apprehensions about the security of our form of government are equally
aroused by those who refuse to recognize the dangers of Communism and those who
will not see danger in anything else.").
19. See TERRORISM, supra note 3, at xii ("The enemy combatant cases represent the
leading edge of U.S. efforts to devise legal rules, consistent with American constitutional
principles and the laws of war, for waging the global war on terror.").
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of the Uighurs' cases.20
This Note addresses the problem of indefinite detention posed by the
Uighurs.2 t Part I provides the factual and legal background of the Uighurs
and their lawsuit, and describes the civil and military circumstances under
which the Court has upheld indefinite detention in the United States. Part
II discusses the legal status of Guantanamo Bay, both after Rasu122 and in
light of a Universalist perspective on the scope of the Constitution.2 3 Part
II then examines the legality of the Uighurs' detentions under substantive
law, asserting that the Uighurs' indefinite detentions are a violation of due
process under the U.S. Constitution, of international treaty and customary
law, and of the United States' domestic case law on civil and military
detentions. Following the conclusion that the Uighurs may not be
detained indefinitely, Part III proposes a solution to the Uighurs' predica-
ment that would strike a more just balance between the interests of all
parties involved. The Note finishes with a brief conclusion.
1. Factual and Legal Background
A. The Uighurs
In late 2001, the U.S. military took into custody twenty-two ethnic
Uighurs in Pakistan and transported them to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 24
20. One of the most striking aspects of the Uighurs' unique predicament is that the
government cannot simply brush the Uighurs under the rug. Although other detainees
have been cleared and released and have simply gone away, the Uighurs, in an unusual
sense, force the United States to be accountable for its actions in the war on terror. The
court, nevertheless, can and may find a loophole through which to avoid the confronta-
tion, but this Note argues that the federal courts have the jurisdiction, the law, and the
remedy to resolve the Uighurs' situation in a manner that does justice to the interests of
both parties involved. One of the themes running through this Note is that the case of
the Uighurs challenges the federal courts to "get it right" because, it seems, the Judiciary
is the only branch of government that can. This is not a case of starry-eyed idealism
contra hard-nosed realism. It is about discrediting and compromising a bedrock princi-
ple of our system for no compelling reason.
21. See infra Part l.B. This Note proceeds on the assumption that indefinite deten-
tion, whether of citizen or alien, is an extreme measure that offends the respect for indi-
vidual liberty at the core of the Constitution. Historically, certain situations have
justified such an extreme measure. This Note examines those situations and recognizes
a common principle that unifies the justified indefinite detention cases. This principle,
my Note argues, does not apply in the case of the Uighurs.
22. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
23. See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 4, at 5 (describing the Universalist perspective on
the scope of the Constitution and arguing that "constitutional provisions that create
rights with no express limitations as to the persons or places covered ... [arel applicable
to every person at every place"). Rights are properly subject to restriction or limitation
to serve countervailing government interests; these rights cannot, however, be deemed
simply inapplicable. See id.; infra Part II.A. for a more detailed discussion.
24. See generally Robin Wright, Chinese Detainees Trapped in Limbo at Guantanamo,
WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2005, at Al1. The details of the Uighurs' capture have been with-
held by the U.S. government. Several of the men were reported to have been initially
captured in the mountains of Pakistan by Pakistani bounty hunters and handed over to
the United States in exchange for money. See Charlie Savage, Put Cleared Detainees in a
Hotel, Lawyer Says; Fears of Repression Keep Them on Base, BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 2005,
at 5; Wright, supra note 24. See also documents prepared by petitioner for litigation
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The legal justification for the Uighurs' detention-as is true of all Guanta-
namo Bay detainees captured in the war on terror 25 -was their status as
"enemy combatants," as determined by the United States government.2 6
In March 2005, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) 27
declared approximately six of the Uighurs "No Longer Enemy Combat-
ants,"' 28 or NLECs, and recommended that the men be released.2 9 While
(copies on file with the author), Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2005)
(No. 05-0497JR).
25. See, e.g., Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 199. ("The status of 'enemy combatant' has
been, until now, the only handhold for the government's claim of executive authority to
hold detainees at Guantanamo. It is the only rationale approved by the Supreme
Court.").
26. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 (2004) (asserting that the basis for
Hamdi's detention was his status as an "enemy combatant"). The Hamdi Court adopted
the Defense Department's definition of "enemy combatant." An "individual who was
part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person
who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy
armed forces." Memorandum from Deputy Sec'y of Def. Paul Wolfowitz, Order Estab-
lishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defen-
selink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf [hereinafter CSRT Memo]. The first use
of the "enemy combatant" term occurred in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942),
which defined enemy combatants as individuals "without uniform," who come "secretly
• .. for the purpose of waging war," and who are "generally deemed not to be entitled to
the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial
and punishment by military tribunals."
27. See CSRT Memo, supra note 26. A CSRT is a military tribunal convened by the
Secretary of the Navy to review the evidence supporting a detainee's status as an enemy
combatant. The tribunal consists of three officers of the U.S. Armed Forces. It is gov-
erned by established procedural rules (for example, the detainee is allowed to call wit-
nesses; the tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence; it is allowed to consider
hearsay) and makes its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. See id. The CSRT
was designed in response to the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Hamdi, which
affirmed the right of an American citizen enemy combatant of the war on terror to chal-
lenge his detention in federal courts. The tribunals have been criticized, however, for
failing to meet the standard laid out in Hamdi and were struck down by the Court in
Hamdan in June 2006. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); "Human
Rights First Analyzes DOD's Combatant Status Review Tribunals," available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/detainees/status-review080204.htm (arguing that
"the new hearings fail to satisfy the Supreme Court's rulings, and are otherwise inade-
quate to meet basic requirements of national and international law") (last visited Apr.
19, 2007). Furthermore, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 purports to make a
determination by the tribunal regarding a detainee's status as an enemy combatant
immune to habeas corpus challenge.
28. See CSRT Memo, supra note 26. The legal significance of the term "no longer
enemy combatant" is unclear. It is used to describe a person whom the U.S. govern-
ment, through a CSRT or other process, has determined is not an "enemy combatant,"
but who in many instances is still being detained. See id. "If the Tribunal determines
that the detainee shall no longer be classified as an enemy combatant ... the Secretary
of Defense ... shall so advise the Secretary of State, in order to permit the Secretary of
State to coordinate the transfer of the detainee for release to the detainee's country of
citizenship or other disposition consistent with domestic and international obligations
and the foreign policy of the United States." See also Hood Declaration, supra note 13
("These [no longer enemy combatant] decisions by the [CSRTs] do not equate to a deter-
mination that the detainees are benign in every respect.").
29. See supra note 13 for the status of the various Uighurs as of December 2006.
This was the second time that at least two of the Uighurs had been cleared for release.
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five of the Uighurs were released last spring, nearly a year after the govern-
ment's rationale for holding them evaporated, and more than four years
since the men were originally captured, approximately seventeen Uighurs
who have been cleared are still behind razor wire, with only limited contact
with the outside world.30
The Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority numbering approximately
eight million and living primarily in northwest China's Xinjiang province,
have inhabited the Asian interior for over 4,000 years.3 1 According to
Amnesty International, the Chinese government has used the international
war on terror to justify a brutal crackdown on a Uighur separatist move-
ment, leading to assassinations, torture, and widespread oppression.
3 2
While the precise details of the Uighurs' arrival at Guantanamo Bay have
been withheld by the U.S. government, 3 3 it is known that at least two of the
men, Chinese citizens, fled China in 2001, intending to travel overland to
Turkey, from where they would send for their families.3 4 These two men,
Abu Bakker Qassim and A'del al-Hakim, left Kyrgyzstan in 2001 and
arrived in Afghanistan, where they received small arms training, for use
against their own repressive government should they require it, the men
said.35 When the U.S. bombing in Afghanistan began in 2001, the Uighurs
crossed into Pakistan, where they were picked up by Pakistani bounty
hunters and handed off to the U.S. military, which reportedly paid $5,000
for each of them.36
With the exception of the five released last spring, the Uighurs have
The first occurred in late 2003, when the Pentagon quietly determined that they were
innocent of wrongdoing. See Wright, supra note 24. According to newspaper reports, the
Uighurs' attorneys were not informed that the men had been cleared for release. See id.
30. See Whitlock, supra note 9; Wright, supra note 24; see also materials prepared by
petitioner for litigation (on file with author), Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
31. See generally "Human Rights Watch, China: Religious Repression of Uighur Mus-
lims," available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/04/11/china10447.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 29, 2006).
32. Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China: Uighurs Fleeing Persecution
as China Wages Its 'War on Terror,"' available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
engasa170212004 (last visited Apr. 19, 2007); see also Human Rights Watch, "Devastat-
ing Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang," available at http://hrw.org/
reports/2005/china0405/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2007); Jim Yardley, Chinese Brand Mus-
lim Groups as Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003, at A3 ("Critics have argued that
China is using the pretense of a campaign against terrorism to legitimize its harsh treat-
ment of Muslim Uighur minorities that are peacefully seeking a separate state in the
western province of Xinjiang.").
33. See Wright, supra note 24; Memorandum from Sabin Willet (Sept. 20, 2005) (on
file with author).
34. See Savage, supra note 24. The little that is known is based on transcripts from
tribunals obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests. See Wright, supra note
24.
35. See Hood Declaration, supra note 13. See also Wright, supra note 24. One
detainee stated he was in Afghanistan for two reasons: "Number one: I am scared of the
torture from my home country. Second: If I go there I will get the training to fight back
against the [Chinese] government." Id.
36. See Savage, supra note 24, at A7.
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been incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay ever since.37 Five years after being
branded terrorists, and three years after the Pentagon approved their
release, the Uighurs are effectively stateless. 3 8 According to the State
Department, returning the Uighurs to China would almost certainly lead to
their death. 39 The United States has approached over 100 countries to take
them in; only Albania, where none of the country's 3.5 million people
speaks the Uighurs' language, where no one practices the Uighurs' form of
Islam, where per capita income is $2,000, and where the Albanian National
Commissioner for Refugees has said the Uighurs cannot stay,40 has done
so. The Bush administration refuses to allow them to enter the United
States, even under restricted supervision, or to appear in court.4 1 Thus,
despite the fact that the Uighurs are either no longer enemy combatants
42
or have been cleared for release, that they have never been charged with a
crime, and that no justification for their detention has been established,
they have passed the fifth anniversary of their incarceration. 4 3 The govern-
ment's position continues to be that the Uighurs will be held for "as long as
it takes."'4 4
B. Indefinite Detention
The Court has found indefinite detention, a deprivation of liberty with
no defined scope or duration, justified in very limited circumstances, and
then only when governed by robust procedural safeguards.4 5 The follow-
ing discussion considers two broad contexts-civil and military-in which
the Court has found indefinite detention justified, and the particular cir-
cumstances relevant to each context that warranted such an extreme mea-
sure. The discussion focuses on the Court's rationale in each instance,
concluding that in both contexts, detention must be closely tied to its pur-
pose, and that once the purpose of the detention-securing the alien's
37. Carol D. Leonnming, Chinese Detainees' Lawyers Will Take Case To High Court,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2006, at A03.
38. See Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 202 ("it appears to be undisputed that the govern-
ment cannot find . . . another country that will accept the petitioners.").
39. See U.S. Dep't of State, China, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Feb.
28, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41640.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 19, 2007) [hereinafter Country Report].
40. See Konviser, supra note 16.
41. See Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum Pursuant to the Court's Invitation
at the August 1, 2005 Hearing, at 1 (Aug. 8, 2005) (on file with author).
42. The construction of this term is highly misleading and prejudicial in the
extreme; it suggests that an individual designated "no longer enemy combatant"
("NLEC") was in actuality determined, via some process, to have been an enemy combat-
ant at one time. The truth is that an NLEC was simply labeled as such. In many
instances, these "enemy combatants" were simply innocent men who found themselves
in the wrong place at the wrong time.
43. See Free the Uighurs, USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 2006, at 12.
44. Transcript of Status Conference at 18, Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (D.D.C.
2005) (No. 05-0497JR) ("So I think [the government's position] would be that we can
continue to hold them in Camp Iguana or something like it as long as it takes.") (on file
with author).
45. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487.
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removal, preventing his escape or commission of harm, or preventing his
return to the battlefield-can no longer be met, detention must cease.
1. Civil Context
The Court has upheld indefinite detention in very few civil situa-
tions.4 6 In cases where it has upheld indefinite detention, the Court feared
physical harm to the detainee or the detainee's escape from custody. 4 7
Danger alone, however, is not sufficient.48 What is required is a showing
of danger "with proof of some additional factor"49 that helps create the
danger, such as mental illness, or a history of sexual violence that makes
future dangerous conduct more likely.50
In the immigration context, indefinite detention is justified to ensure
the removal of excludable or removable aliens. 5 1 Because removable aliens
released into the general population may pose a flight risk, or even a threat
to public safety, the Court may be justified in upholding indefinite deten-
tion so that the aliens can be monitored. 5 2
The Court's treatment of detention in the immigration context began
with a case involving the exclusion of an immigrant, Ignatz Mezei, for rea-
sons of national security, which left him stranded indefinitely on Ellis
Island. 53 In overruling the district court's grant of conditional parole on
46. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 (1997) (upholding indefinite preven-
tive detention where it affected only a "small segment of particularly dangerous individ-
uals"); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (upholding a detention
scheme because it was reserved for the "most serious crimes" and required proof of
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence). But see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 81 (1992) (striking down a detention system that placed the burden on the detainee
to prove non-dangerousness).
47. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of
Zadvydas v. Davis, Guo. IMMIG. L.J., 369, 369-70 (2002).
48. Id.
49. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 347.
50. See id.
51. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Zadvydas did not deter-
mine whether preventing flight was a sufficient justification for indefinite detention.
Instead, the Court held that where an alien's removal is unlikely to be effectuated, flight
prevention is not sufficient, following the reasoning in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
738 (1972), that where detention's goal is no longer attainable, detention is no longer
related to the purpose for which the person was held, and is thus no longer justified. See
id.
52. See id.
53. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 206. The facts, as best as the Mezei Court could make out,
were as follows. Mezei was born in Gibraltar of East European parents and lived legally
in the United States from 1923 to 1948. Id. at 208. In 1948 he left the country to visit
his mother on her deathbed in Romania. Id. at 208. Unable to secure a visa to enter
Romania, Mezei settled in Hungary for nineteen months before traveling by ship from
France to New York. Id. Before re-entering the United States, the Attorney General
issued permanent exclusion orders based on confidential information that admitting
Mezei would be "prejudicial to the public interest for security reasons." Id. Attempts to
secure Mezei's departure were unsuccessful. France, Great Britain, Hungary and
approximately a dozen Latin American countries all refused Mezei's entry. Id. at 209.
Without a country to take him in, Mezei remained on Ellis Island for twenty-one months
before his habeas petition was heard. Id.
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bond,5 4 the Supreme Court framed the issue in Mezei to be one of exclu-
sion, not detention. 5 5 The governmental action, the Court said, was
Mezei's exclusion-the refusal to allow Mezei to enter the United States.
56
In other words, Mezei's detention, indefinite or otherwise, was simply the
unfortunate outcome of the United States' legitimate decision to exclude
Mezei,5 7 and of other countries' unwillingness to take him in.5 8
The Court treated Mezei as an alien on the threshold of initial entry
into the United States.5 9 The Court held that Ellis Island, for purposes of
conferring legal rights, was not part of the United States.60 Placed in this
box-as a non-U.S. citizen who had not passed through our gates-Mezei
was outside the reach of the Due Process Clause,6 1 and that indefinite
detention in Mezei's case did not violate the Constitution.
6 2
In Zadvydas v. Davis,6 3 the Court considered the indefinite detention
of aliens lawfully present in the United States who, due to criminal convic-
tions, had subsequently been ordered removed. 64 The specific issue before
54. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 101 F. Supp. 66, 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1951). The district court judge accepted the validity of Mezei's exclusion. He was troub-
led, however, by the fact that Mezei had no place to go, and held that detention after
twenty-one months was excessive, absent affirmative proof that Mezei posed a danger to
public safety. See id.
55. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 209-10.
56. Id. at 210.
57. Id. ("Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fun-
damental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments
largely immune from judicial control.").
58. Id. at 208-209.
59. Id. at 212. This was despite the fact that Mezei had been a resident alien in the
United States for sixteen years, and had a wife and family living in Buffalo, New York.
See id. at 216-17 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 215.
61. Infamously, the Court, describing an alien in similar circumstances, stated:
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien
denied entry is concerned." United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
544 (1950). On the other hand, "aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of
fairness encompassed in due process of law." Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (citing Kaoru
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903)).
62. In his dissent, Justice Robert H. Jackson argued that Mezei should not have been
denied a hearing simply because he was an alien detained outside the United States. See
id. at 219 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson considered Mezei's condition to be a
form of incarceration, despite his technical "freedom" to leave for anywhere except the
United States. See id. at 220-21. The question forJustice Jackson thus was whether this
deprivation of Mezei's freedom was also a denial of due process. See id. at 221 (Jackson,
J., dissenting). Justice Jackson did not question the government's ability to detain,
exclude, or deport aliens, whether friendly or hostile, so long as procedural due process
governed the government's action. "Congress has ample power to determine whom we
will admit to our shores and by what means it will effectuate its exclusion policy. The
only limitation is that it may not do so by authorizing United States officers to take
without due process ... the liberty ... of an alien who has come within our jurisdiction;
and that means he must meet a fair hearing with fair notice of the charges." Id. at 228
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
63. 533 U.S. at 678.
64. Id. at 682. The Zadvydas Court considered the detentions of two aliens. The
first was Kestustis Zadvydas, a resident alien born to Lithuanian parents in a German
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the Court was whether the immigration statute65 granted the Attorney
General the authority indefinitely to detain a removable alien beyond the
removal period, or instead implicitly limited the detention to a period rea-
sonably necessary to secure the alien's removal. 66 In concluding the latter,
the Court, contrary to the spirit of Mezei, construed the statute to contain
an implicit reasonable time limitation, arguing that the "indefinite deten-
tion of aliens ... would raise serious constitutional concerns"'6 7 where the
proceedings are civil, not criminal, and are not punitive. 6 8
The Court focused on two rationales proposed by the government for
the continued detentions. The Court stated, the first, preventing flight, was
"weak or nonexistent where removal seems a remote possibility at best."6 9
The Court recognized the second rationale, protection of the community,
as a legitimate concern and held that, in the context of particularly danger-
ous individuals, indefinite detention subject to strong procedural safe-
guards is permissible. 70 This circumstance did not exist in the case of
displaced persons camp, who came to the United States at age eight and subsequently
acquired an extensive criminal record, including convictions for drug possession,
attempted robbery, burglary, and theft. See id. After serving two years in prison,
Zadvydas was turned over to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which ordered
him deported to Germany. See id. Germany, however, refused to accept him because he
was not a German citizen; Lithuania also refused to accept him for the same reason. See
id. The Dominican Republic, where Zadvydas's wife held citizenship, also refused. See
id. In the meantime, the INS held Zadvydas in custody beyond the expiration of the
removal time. In granting Zadvydas's habeas petition, the federal district court stated
that the government would never succeed in its removal efforts, thereby leading to his
permanent confinement, in violation of the Constitution. See Zadvydas v. Caplinger,
986 F. Supp. 1011, 1027 (E.D.La. 1997), cited in Zadvydas, 553 U.S. at 685. The second
alien in Zadvydas was a Cambodian citizen, Kim Ho Ma, whose family fled Cambodia
for refugee camps in Thailand and arrived in the United States when Ma was seven years
old. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. In 1995, when he was seventeen, Ma was involved in
a gang shooting and was convicted of manslaughter. See id.
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V):
An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible . . . [2] [or] removable [for
reasons of, e.g., security or foreign policy or as a result of violations of criminal
law] or [3] who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained
beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of
supervision.
Id.
66. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682. The Court pointedly did not address this issue in
the context of aliens not yet on U.S. soil. See id. ("Aliens who have not yet gained initial
admission to this country would present a very different question."). On this issue, see
the discussion of Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), infra.
67. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682.
68. See id. at 690 ("Freedom from imprisonment ... lies at the heart of the liberty
[the Due Process] Clause protects .... And this Court has said that government deten-
tion violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with
adequate procedural protections, . . . or, in certain special and 'narrow' nonpunitive
'circumstances' . . . where a special justification ... outweighs the 'individual's constitu-
tionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint." (citations omitted)).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 691.
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Zadvydas.71
Rather than overturn Mezei, the Zadvydas Court distinguished it on
the ground that Mezei's presence on Ellis Island did not constitute an entry
into the United States. 7 2 For constitutional purposes, the Court reasoned,
Mezei was "stopped at the border."73 Zadvydas, on the other hand, was
already admitted. That, in the Court's eyes, "made all the difference." 74
Thus, the Court held that where the government has no reasonable pros-
pect of removing an individual, the government cannot indefinitely detain
the individual without violating the Due Process Clause. 75 Instead, the
government may hold the detainee for a period "reasonably necessary" to
effectuate an alien's removal, which, the Court said, is presumptively six
months. 7 6 After six months, the alien may be conditionally released if he
can show that there is no "significant likelihood of removal in the reasona-
bly foreseeable future."'77
In Clark v. Martinez,78 decided in 2005, the Court extended Zadvydas
to aliens deemed inadmissible to the United States. 79 The Clark Court con-
fronted the question, left open in Zadvydas, whether aliens not admitted to
the United States were subject to indefinite detention. 80 The Court held
that because the language in the immigration statute does not distinguish
between admitted and non-admitted aliens, the limitation on the govern-
ment's ability to detain is the same in either case.8 1
Clark involved a habeas challenge to the indefinite detentions of two
Mariel Cubans8 2 who were paroled into the United States after their arrival
71. See id. at 690 ("The proceedings at issue here are civil, not criminal, and we
assume that they are nonpunitive in purpose and effect. There is no sufficiently strong
special justification here for indefinite civil detention .
72. See id. at 693.
73. Id.
74. Id. ("The distinction between an alien who has effected entry into the United
States and one who has never entered runs throughout immigration law.").
75. Id. at 690.
76. Id. at 699-701.
77. Id. at 700-01. The rule laid out in Zadvydas-that the removal period is pre-
sumptively reasonable for up to six months-is not absolute. After six months, the alien
must provide good reason to believe that removal is significantly unlikely in the reasona-
bly foreseeable future, whereupon the government has the opportunity to rebut the
claim. See id. Until the alien shows this, he may be detained. See id. Justice Breyer's
opinion in Zadvydas also left open the possibility of preventive detention in cases of
"terrorism or other special circumstances," which was not an issue with Zadvydas. See
id. at 696.
78. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
79. Id. at 386.
80. See id. at 378-79.
81. See id. at 377 (noting that the pertinent language of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), "may
be detained beyond the removal period," "applies without differentiation to all three
categories of aliens [inadmissible, removable, and those ordered removed because they
pose a risk to the community or a flight risk] that are its subject").
82. Id. at 374. In 1980, approximately 125,000 Cuban aliens arrived in Florida
aboard a flotilla of boats, known as the Mariel boatlift. See, e.g., Palma v. Verdeyen, 676
F.2d 100, 101 (C.A.Va. 1982). Authorities in Cuba encouraged criminals held in its
prisons to travel to the United States. Some 25,000 persons with criminal backgrounds
arrived, 2,000 of whom were determined by immigration officials to require further
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on the Florida shore.8 3 Because of criminal convictions subsequent to
their arrival in the United States, they were taken into custody by the then-
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) pending removal, where
they were held beyond the normal ninety-day removal period.8 4 The
Court, viewing Zadvydas as a decision of statutory construction,8 5 held
that the six-month presumptive detention period also applies to inadmissi-
ble aliens,8 6 because the government could provide no logical explanation
for why a different time period should apply.8 7 The upshot of Clark is that
the indefinite detention of this constitutionally ambiguous category of per-
sons, inadmissible aliens, must meet the basic requirements of due
process.8 8
Thus, in the civil context, indefinite detention has been upheld where
there is a risk of danger of physical harm or escape, so long as the deten-
tion persists only for as long as removal is foreseeable.8 9 The immigration
cases in particular stand for the principle that detention should be tied
closely to its purpose. 90 Once the purpose of the detention-securing the
alien's removal, preventing his escape or his harming the public-can no
longer be met by detention, the detention must cease. 91 Zadvydas and
Clark together hold that this is true whether the detainee is a citizen or an
alien, deportable92 or even admissible.9 3 Furthermore, once the govern-
ment determines that the detainee has entered the United States, the
detention. See id. The majority of the remainder were paroled into the United States.
See id.
83. See Clark, 543 U.S. at 374. The two men, Sergio Martinez and Daniel Benitez,
arrived in the United States in June 1980 and were subsequently paroled into the coun-
try at the discretion of the Attorney General. See id. U.S. policy regarding the Mariel
Cubans allowed the parolees to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resident
after one year. Neither Martinez nor Benitez qualified for adjustment, however, because
both men had been convicted of felonies after their arrival in the United States. See id.
Benitez's parole was revoked in 1993, shortly after he was imprisoned for his convic-
tions; Martinez's parole was revoked in late 2000. See id. at 375. Both men were
detained pending removal beyond the 90-day removal period. Both men subsequently
filed habeas challenges to their detentions. See id. at 376-77. In Martinez's case, the
federal district court ordered his release on the ground that removal was not reasonably
foreseeable. See Martinez v. Smith, No. CV 02-972-PA (Oct. 30, 2002). In Benitez's case,
the federal district court similarly concluded that removal would not occur in the fore-
seeable future but nevertheless denied the habeas petition. See Benitez v. Wallis, 337
F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003).
84. Clark, 543 U.S. at 375.
85. Id. at 384 ("[Zadvydas] held that, since interpreting the statute to authorize
indefinite detention ... would approach constitutional limits, the statute should be read
... to authorize detention only for a period consistent with the purpose of effectuating
removal.").
86. Id. at 386.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 386-87.
90. See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 678.
93. Clark, 543 U.S. at 386.
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detainee is entitled to rights under the Constitution.94
2. Military Context
Ex parte Endo,95 which arose out of the internment of a U.S. citizen of
Japanese ancestry following the attack on Pearl Harbor, sheds light on
acceptable justifications for indefinite detention in the context of military
activity. In Endo, the Supreme Court confronted the continued detention
of a Japanese woman, Mitsuye Endo, after a military tribunal had estab-
lished her loyalty to the United States. 96 The Court held that it was not
within the Executive's authority to detain indefinitely an internee after a
review process determined that concerns regarding her loyalty to the
United States were unfounded.
9 7
Endo, who lived in Sacramento, was detained pursuant to military
orders following the attack on Pearl Harbor. 9 8 A review of Endo's intern-
ment9 9 determined that she posed no threat of espionage or sabotage; 10 0
nevertheless, she continued to be detained. 1 1 Endo subsequently filed a
writ of habeas corpus alleging that she was a loyal and law-abiding citizen,
that no charges had been brought against her, and that she was being
unlawfully detained. 10 2
In ordering Endo's unconditional release, the Court did not examine
the constitutional issues underlying her claim. Rather, the Court's analysis
focused on the Executive's power to detain as that power derived from Con-
gress's grant of authority,1° 3 and the Executive's creation of a civilian
agency to carry out that power. Thus, while the Court did not directly
address the constitutional issues presented by Endo's detention, it did
94. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212.
95. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War to take mea-
sures leading to "the successful prosecution of the war." Id. at 285-86; Exec. Order No.
9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). One such measure was Civilian Exclusion Order No. 52,
May 7, 1942, which ordered that "all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-
alien," be excluded from Sacramento, California. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 288; Civilian
Exclusion Order No. 52, May 7, 1942.
96. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 292-94.
97. See id. at 301.
98. Id. at 284-85.
99. Endo was granted "leave clearance," a process whose purpose was to determine
the "probable effect upon the war program and upon the public peace and security of
issuing indefinite leave" to the applicant. See id. at 292. An application for indefinite
leave, which Endo did not file, was required in order to leave the Relocation Center. See
id. at 292, 294.
100. Id. at 294.
101. Id. at 285.
102. Id. The government did not dispute any of the above. Id. Instead, it argued that
continued detention after leave clearance had been granted was simply a necessary step
in the government's program to evacuate from the West Coast all persons of Japanese
descent. Id. at 295.
103. Id. at 299-301 (favoring an "interpretation of legislation which gives it the
greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality," the Court adopted a construc-
tion of the statute that allowed for "the greatest possible accommodation between the
liberties [of the citizen] and the exigencies of war").
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interpret the legislation in a manner that would survive a constitutional
challenge. 104 The Court reasoned that the agency's power to detain was
derived from the Executive's mandate to protect the war effort against espi-
onage and sabotage, and, most importantly for present purposes, held that
detention that "has no relationship to that objective" is not permissible. 105
In other words, the government agency did not have the authority to hold
Endo after her loyalty was established. 10 6
Similarly, the petitioner in Korematsu v. U.S.,1o7 charged with remain-
ing in an area prohibited to persons of Japanese ancestry, challenged a
measure taken by the government in reaction to the attack on Pearl Har-
bor.' 8 The Court upheld the government's action-which the Court char-
acterized as exclusion rather than detention' 0 9 -because exclusion from a
threatened area had "a definite and close relationship to the prevention of
espionage and sabotage." 1 10
The Court acknowledged the burden the measures placed on Japa-
nese-Americans,"'I, as well as its exclusive applicability to persons of Japa-
nese descent. 112 It stated that "[niothing short of apprehension by the
proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public
safety can constitutionally justify"'1 13 such a deprivation. The military
claimed the measure was necessary because an unascertained number of
Japanese citizens posed an imminent threat to public safety, and because it
104. Id. at 299.
105. Id. at 301-02.
106. Id. at 297.
107. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
108. See id. at 220. Under the authority of Executive Order 9066, supra note 95, the
Secretary of War issued Exclusion Order No. 34, one element of which was the indefi-
nite exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from much of the West Coast, with the
stated purpose of preventing espionage and sabotage following the United States' decla-
ration of war on Japan. See 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (1942); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217. Kore-
matsu had actually been charged with the violation of an Act of Congress that made it a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment up to one year to "enter, remain in, leave, or
commit any act" in a military zone prescribed by the Secretary of War. See Act of Mar.
21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173, (codified as 18 U.S.C.A. 97a). The district court con-
victed Korematsu of violating the act for having remained in San Leandro, CA, a "mili-
tary area" where he lived. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215.
109. See id. at 218-23. In his dissent, Chief Justice Owen J. Roberts disagreed with
this characterization, arguing that where exclusion in name results in detention in prac-
tice, the governmental action should be characterized as such. See id. at 226, 229 (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting) ("The obvious purpose of the [exclusion] orders...was to drive all
citizens of Japanese ancestry into Assembly Centers within the zones of their residence,
under pain of criminal prosecution.").
110. Id. at 218.
111. Id. at 219 ("[Wle are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by [the exclusion
order] upon a large group of American citizens. But hardships are part of war, and war is
an aggregation of hardships. All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the
impact of war in greater or lesser measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as
its privileges, and in time of war the burden is always heavier.").
112. Id. at 217. There were two measures taken: first, a curfew was imposed in the
military areas; subsequent to that, complete exclusion was imposed. Of the curfew the
Court said, "to apply the curfew order against none but citizens of Japanese ancestry
amounted to a constitutionally prohibited discrimination solely on account of race." Id.
113. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
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was impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of those Japanese
citizens posing a threat.1 4 Such a sweeping measure-the exclusion of all
members of the Japanese community-was permissible for as long as it
served its legitimate purpose, namely to prevent further attacks. 1 5 Once
that purpose could no longer be served, however, the exclusion would have
to cease.116
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,"17 a case arising out of the detention on U.S.
soil of a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan," 8 the Court dealt princi-
pally with an enemy combatant's right to challenge his categorization as
such, and the amount of process that is mandated by the Constitution in
such a case. 1 9 The Court held that the detention of individuals was a
"fundamental and accepted" incident to war, and that in granting the Presi-
dent authorization to use force against perpetrators of the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, Congress authorized the perpetrators' detentions as
114. Id. at 218-19.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 246 (stating that a military order is not to last longer than the military
emergency for which it is enacted) (Jackson, J., dissenting). This point was reaffirmed in
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520, where the Court stated that "[it] is a clearly established princi-
ple of the law of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities."
117. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
118. Id. at 510. Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen born in Louisiana in 1980, was
captured in Afghanistan in 2001 by the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups
opposed to the governing Taliban, and turned over to the United States. See id. Hamdi
was initially detained and questioned in Afghanistan, and then was transferred to the
U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. See id. When it was discovered that Hamdi was a
U.S. citizen, he was transferred to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, and later to a brig in
Charleston, South Carolina, where he was held without charge or access to counsel. See
id. at 510-11. Hamdi's father claimed that Hamdi had gone to Afghanistan two months
prior to September 11, 2001, to do relief work, that he did not receive military training,
and that he became trapped in Afghanistan after the U.S. military campaign there there.
See id. at 511-12. In support of Hamdi's detention, the government offered a statement
by Michael Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, which
simply claimed, based on his familiarity with the facts and circumstances surrounding
the capture of Yaser Hamdi, that Hamdi traveled to Afghanistan during the summer of
2001, that he "affiliated" with the Taliban and received weapons training, and that when
the Northern Alliance engaged in battle with the Taliban, Hamdi surrendered. See id. at
512-13.
119. Id. at 509. In its holding, the Court first established that the President received
authorization to detain citizens identified as enemy combatants pursuant to the Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"), which it held to be explicit congressional
permission for the use of force and, as a "fundamental and accepted" "incident to war,"
the detention of individuals. See id. at 518; see Authorization for Use of Military Force,
115 Stat. 224. The Court thus simultaneously refuted Hamdi's principle claim-that his
detention was illegal because it violated 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), which forbids detention
absent an Act of Congress-because the Court held that the "AUMF satisfied § 4001(a)'s
requirement that a detention be 'pursuant to an Act of Congress."' Id. at 517. The
Court then held that absent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus is available to every
individual detained in the United States, thus enabling enemy combatants held in the
United States to challenge their determination as such. See id. at 525. Finally, the Court
held that when challenging one's status as an enemy combatant, a citizen detainee is
entitled to receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and an opportunity to
rebut the government's assertions before a neutral decisionmaker. See id. at 538.
Vol. 40
2007 The Uighurs
well. 1 20 In issuing its ruling, the Court noted that "the purpose of deten-
tion is to prevent captured individuals from returning to the field of battle
and taking up arms once again." 1 21
Importantly, the Court noted that under established principles of the
laws of war, prisoners must be released upon the cessation of active hostili-
ties,12 2 and that repatriation should occur with the least possible delay. 123
This is because continued detention beyond the cessation of hostilities
does not serve the limited purpose for which detention is permissible. 1 24
The purpose of such detention is to prevent the detainees from returning to
the battlefield. Responding to Hamdi's claim that the President was not
authorized indefinitely or perpetually to detain prisoners, the Court held
that "[tihe United States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities,
individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants...1 25 but
determined that "indefinite detention for the purpose of interrogation is not
authorized.''1
26
The limitation here, as in the World War II detention cases, is that
detention during wartime must be closely tied to a legitimate purpose. 127
The military cases indicate that even in the context of extreme circum-
stances surrounding war, the use of indefinite detention is governed by
necessity and is permitted only for certain narrowly circumscribed pur-
poses.1 28 One widely recognized and accepted purpose is preventing the
detainee from returning to the field of battle. 129 If such a purpose no
longer exists, detention is no longer permissible. 130
While the Uighurs, of course, are not U.S. citizens, this fact is not rele-
vant to the rationale underlying indefinite and arbitrary detention, as
articulated in the cases regarding the indefinite detention of aliens in the
immigration context.' 3 1 Part II of this Note will argue that the Uighurs'
120. See id. at 518; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 (holding that the capture and
detention of combatants, by "universal agreement and practice," are "important inci-
dent[s] of war").
121. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (citing numerous authorities for the proposition that the
sole purpose of detention during war is to prevent the detainees from further participa-
tion in the war).
122. Id. at 520 (citing Article 118 of the Geneva Convention (Ill) Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War (Aug. 12, 1949); Article 20 of the Hague Convention (I) on
Laws and Customs of War on Land (July 29, 1899)).
123. Id.
124. See id. (explaining that the "conclusion of peace" marks both the end of the
threat posed by a detainee and the need for a detainee's extended detention).
125. Id. at 521 (emphasis added).
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 300-32 (1944) (discussing the use of a test of
constitutionality in assessing the relationship of the detention to its purpose). See gener-
ally Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (evaluating whether the purpose of the detention justified
it); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (examining the legitimacy of detentions in light of the
exigencies of a war).
128. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
129. See id. at 518.
130. See id. at 520 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War arts. 118, 85, 99, 119, 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
131. See supra Part I.B.1.
Cornell International Law Journal
continued detention serves no legitimate or acceptable purpose, because
the United States no longer has a legal justification to detain them. The
Uighurs were not picked up on the field of battle. Furthermore, the
Uighurs have been determined NLECs or have otherwise been cleared for
release. Thus, there is no reasonable fear of their returning to the battle-
field. If the United States continues to detain the Uighurs after determin-
ing that they do not pose a threat, their detention becomes a form of
punishment. 132 Both case law in the United States and the international
laws of war prohibit punishment as an aspect of detention. 133 In the
absence of a legitimate purpose, this Note argues, it is unlawful to continue
to detain the Uighurs.
II. Illegality of the Uighurs' Indefinite Detention
As the foregoing discussion concludes, the Supreme Court has upheld
indefinite detention only in rare, highly circumscribed circumstances. 134
The subject of Part II of this Note is the legality of indefinite detention as
applied to the Uighurs, aliens indefinitely detained on non-U.S. territory
despite having been cleared for release or determined no longer enemy
combatants. The jurisdiction of the federal courts to rule on matters that
arise at Guantanamo Bay, however, is itself highly controversial and war-
rants our attention before turning to the legality of the Uighurs' detentions.
A. Legal Status of Guantanamo Bay
The United States's presence at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, extends back
to 1903, when the United States entered a lease agreement with the Cuban
government that granted it the right to exercise "complete jurisdiction and
control" over the forty-five-square-mile parcel of land along the Cuban
coast.13 5 The legal status of Guantanamo Bay for purposes of applying
statutory and constitutional law has been the subject of much litigation;
the majority of the cases hold that the base lies on Cuban, not U.S., soil.13 6
The official position of the U.S. government is that while the United States
exerts complete control over Guantanamo, Guantanamo ultimately remains
sovereign Cuban territory. 13 7 Because of this, the government argues, U.S.
law does not apply there. 138
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See supra Part I.
135. Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, Feb. 16-23,
1903, T.S. No. 418. The lease was granted for fueling purposes and was extended by a
1934 treaty declaring that "so long as the United States of America shall not abandon
the ... naval station at Guantanamo, the lease would remain in effect until the parties
agreed otherwise." See also Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. Ill, May
29, 1934, T.S. No. 866.
136. See Cuban American Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425-25 (11th Cir.
1995); Bird v. U.S., 923 F. Supp. 338, 343 (D.Conn. 1996); Colon v. U.S., No. 82 Civ.
34, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16071, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 1982).
137. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.
138. See id. at 467.
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The government's argument-that the U.S. Constitution extends up to
but not beyond the territorial borders of the United States-derives from a
territorial notion of the Constitution's scope,' 39 but the Court's strict
observance of the territorial position may be waning.' 40 Despite its adher-
ence to territoriality, the Supreme Court held in 2004 that in light of the
federal habeas statute, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear matters aris-
ing at Guantanamo Bay. 14 1 The Court did so by resting its opinion on
something of a technicality: whether 28 U.S.C. § 2241,142 the federal
habeas statute, applied both to citizens and to aliens held abroad. The
Court held that it did. 143 The Court did not, however, determine the
extent to which constitutional rights are available to aliens held at Guanta-
namo Bay. 144
In finding that the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction extended to
Guantanamo Bay, 145 the Court defied precedent, 14 6 finding federal courts'
reach limited not by geographical boundaries, as it traditionally had,14 7
but by the nature of the United States' presence in non-sovereign territory.
In Johnson v. Eisentrager,148 the leading case in this area, the Court had
denied habeas relief to twenty-one German nationals convicted by U.S. mil-
itary tribunals in China of violating the laws of war and subsequently
brought to Germany to serve their sentences. 149 The Eisentrager analysis
focused on customary notions of jurisdiction over an individual rising out
139. See NEUMAN, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing territoriality as it relates to immi-
grants outside U.S. borders). See Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2506 (defining "territorial-
ity" as the conception that "[tihe physical location of an individual determines the legal
rules applicable and the legal rights that individual possesses").
140. See Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2546 (arguing that "territoriality," the notion that
geographic location determines legal rules, makes less and less sense in a globalized
world).
141. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 ("[T]he federal courts have jurisdiction to determine
the legality of the Executive's potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to
be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.").
142. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
143. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
144. Id.
145. The writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed in the Constitution's Suspension
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl.2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."). Habeas is the "traditional means by which courts in this country...
determine whether petitioners are deprived of their freedom in violation of the law."
LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 1 (2003). The federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions of persons challenging the war-time detention
orders of military tribunals, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), and, at least until
recently, by resident aliens in removal proceedings for prior criminal offenses, INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
146. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950).
147. See, e.g., Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2504. The relationship of geographical
boundaries and legal status is illustrated by the familiar imagery of Cuban refugees
striving to reach U.S. soil before border officials can seize them. The refugees' legal
status is determined by the fact of their having touched, literally, U.S. soil. See id.
148. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
149. Id. at 765 ("The ultimate question in this case is one of jurisdiction of civil
courts of the United States vis-a-vis military authorities in dealing with enemy aliens
overseas.").
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of the person's physical presence outside the sovereign territory of the
United States. 150 The outcome in Eisentrager depended not on the status
of the aliens as enemies, but rather on their lack of presence within the
United States.
The Court in Rasul looked instead to the nature of the United States'
occupation of Guantanamo Bay.15 ' Specific facts of the detentions assisted
the Court in distinguishing the detainees from those in Eisentrager: the
Guantanamo detainees were not citizens of countries at war with the
United States;15 2 they had never been charged with wrongdoing;' 53 and
they were detained on land which in "every practical respect [was] United
States territory."' 5 4
As a result of this controversial 15 5 decision, the Uighurs may bring
their habeas claims in the federal courts. Rasul might also assist the
Uighurs in gaining rights to limit the manner in which the government may
detain them. 15 6 Thus, while Rasul notably left open the question of what
substantive law would be available to the Uighurs, 15 7 it did settle matters,
at least as regards the Judicial branch, regarding the federal courts' ability
to hear Guantanamo Bay habeas claims. 158
150. See id. at 768 ("Nothing in the text of the Constitution extends [the right to
habeas corpus] . . . [to] an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no state of his
captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.").
151. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004). The 1903 lease under which the United
States occupies Guantanamo recognizes Cuba's "ultimate sovereignty," but grants the
United States "complete jurisdiction and control over" the area. Id. (quoting Lease of
Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, art. II, Feb. 16-23, 1903, T.S. No.
418).
152. Id. at 476 ("[The Guantanamo petitioners] are not nationals of countries at war
with the United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggres-
sion against the United States.").
153. Id. ("[T]hey have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged
with and convicted of wrongdoing . . .").
154. Id. at 476, 487 ("[Flor more than two years they have been imprisoned in terri-
tory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control."). In his
concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy notes that the lease under which the United
States holds Guantanamo Bay is "no ordinary lease": "Its term is indefinite and at the
discretion of the United States." Id. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring). At Guantanamo
Bay, the United States has "unchallenged and indefinite" control, which it has exercised
for many years, producing "a place that belongs to the United States, extending the
'implied protection' of the United States to it." Id.
155. See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 159-64 (criticizing the Rasul decision for
failing adequately to heed precedent, failing to think through the implications of its
holding, and failing to consider whether federal law provided substantive relief for the
alien detainees).
156. See supra Part II.B.1.
157. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.1.
158. Congress is entitled to amend the federal habeas statute denying aliens access to
the federal courts. At present, the recently enacted Military Commissions Bill of 2006
strips the federal courts of the habeas jurisdiction asserted in Rasul. Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 7(e)(1) (2006). Many scholars believe, however, that this
legislation will wind up before the Supreme Court of the United States and will be
struck down. See, e.g., supra note 2.
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B. Lawfulness of the Uighurs' Indefinite Detention
The fact that the Rasul Court extended the writ of habeas corpus to
Guantanamo Bay 159 does not extend substantive law to an overseas juris-
diction. 160 But the reasoning of Rasul, as well as its dicta, 161 supports the
argument that alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to at least
some of the rights and protections afforded by the Constitution. 16 2 "Effec-
tive" U.S. territory-a decisive factor in Rasul-is no less effectively U.S.
territory when the right at issue is a constitutional right to due process
rather than a statutory right to habeas corpus.1 6 3 Subsequently, if Guanta-
namo Bay were the equivalent of U.S. territory for purposes of habeas
corpus, then alien detainees there would effectively be "present" in the
United States, which under established alienage law would trigger more
substantial constitutional protections.'
6 4
Furthermore, given the nature and manner in which the United States
occupies Guantanamo-it is under the exclusive control of the United
States, and Cuban law has no application therel 6 5 -Guantanamo is an
unusual case. It is akin to Justice Oliver Wendel Holmes's "region subject
to no sovereign,"'166 into which the United States could extend its law,
159. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
160. See Wedgwood, supra note 7; Part II.A.
161. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n.15 (2004) ("Petitioners' allegations-that.., they have
been held in Executive detention for more than two years ... without access to counsel
and without being charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably describe 'custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" (citations omit-
ted)). This statement suggests that the Court believed the detainees in Rasul were enti-
tled to at least some measure of procedural due process; their custody, which the Court
stated was a "violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," was
so, apparently, because it was carried out in the absence of access to counsel or notice of
wrongdoing, the two principle procedural due process rights. Judge Joyce Green of the
District Court for the District of Columbia interpreted this footnote to mean that the
Constitution applies to the Guantanamo Bay territory. "[I]t is difficult to imagine that
the Justices would have remarked that the petitions 'unquestionably describe custody in
violation of the Constitution' . . . unless they considered the petitioners to be within a
territory in which constitutional rights are guaranteed." In re Guantanamo Detainee
Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (D.D.C. 2005).
162. The federal courts are divided over this issue. On the one hand, Judge Richard
Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has ruled that non-resident
aliens captured and detained outside the United States have no constitutional rights.
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321 (D.D.C. 2005) ("Due to their status as aliens
outside sovereign United States territory with no connection to the United States, it was
well established prior to Rasul that the petitioners possess no cognizable constitutional
rights."). On the other hand, Judge Green of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia has ruled that non-resident aliens captured and detained outside the United
States do have constitutional rights. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d
443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005) [hereinafter Detainee cases] ("Guantanamo Bay must be consid-
ered the equivalent of a U.S. territory in which fundamental constitutional rights
apply.").
163. Khalid, 355 F.Supp.2d at 321.
164. Id. ("In the final analysis, the lynchpin for extending constitutional protections
beyond the citizenry to aliens was and remains 'the alien's presence within its territorial
jurisdiction."').
165. Khalid, 355 F.Supp.2d at 321.
166. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909).
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because absent U.S. law no law would govern in the area. 16 7 In effect,
territory over which the United States exerts complete "unchallenged and
indefinite" control, 168 although it is not sovereign U.S. territory, would, in
the absence of U.S. law, be a zone of lawlessness. t 69 As such, unlike the
petitioners in Eisentrager, who, because they were held in Germany, were
not outside German domestic law, the Guantanamo Bay detainees and
their keepers are protected by no country's domestic laws if U.S. law does
not apply.170
Generally, aliens are entitled to constitutional protections only if they
are present in the United States. 171 For example, in U.S. v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,17 2 the Court held that an alien defendant tried in a U.S. court
could not raise a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search conducted by
U.S. law enforcement officials in Mexico.1 73 But this holding is controver-
sial and has been hotly disputed, and courts and commentators have
argued that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between aliens
and citizens in this regard, 1 74 as the federal courts currently do. 175 As one
167. See id. at 356 ("The general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the
act is done," but in areas where another sovereign's law did not apply, the gap would be
filled by U.S. law).
168. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. See, e.g., Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1, 47 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(arguing to extend constitutional protections to enemy aliens before military tribunals
overseas, stating that "the Constitution follows the flag"). The Yamishita Court heard
the habeas petition of a Japanese soldier detained and sentenced to death in the Philip-
pines, U.S. territory at the time, by a U.S. military tribunal during World War II.
170. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
171. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 ("It is well established that certain constitutional
protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside
our geographic borders."); U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that
a Mexican citizen's home in Mexico could be searched by U.S. law enforcement without
a warrant and resulting evidence used at trial); Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 ("[Alliens who
have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceed-
ings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of
law.").
172. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
173. See id. at 267. He could, the Court suggested, if the search had been conducted
on the alien's property within U.S. borders. See id. The Court hinged this distinction on
the fact that the Constitution refers to "the people," which it defined as "a class of per-
sons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community." Id. at 265. But
note Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which relied less on the majority's interpretation of
"the people" and focused more on the impracticality involved in granting Fourth Amend-
ment protections under the facts of this case. Id. at 278 (Kennedy,J., concurring). Deci-
sive for Kennedy was the impracticability of having U.S. authorities seek out a warrant
for a search taking place in Mexico, where there were no equivalent magistrates to issue
the warrant and differing standards of privacy and for what constitutes an unreasonable
search. Id.
174. See, e.g., U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974) (arguing in a
Fourth Amendment case that there is no justification for "a different rule with respect to
aliens who are victims of unconstitutional action abroad...").
175. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This watershed opinion held, in a case
involving the murders overseas of U.S. military officers by their American wives, that the
Constitution governed acts by the U.S. government against U.S. citizens. Justice Hugo
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commentator has pointed out, it is difficult to reconcile a Constitution that
is neutral as to citizenship when it limits government acts within the
United States with one that distinguishes between citizens and aliens when
it limits government acts outside the United States. 176
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether Guantanamo Bay is
unequivocally "foreign" territory. 17 7 The Bush Administration's argument
in the Guantanamo cases relies on the Eisentrager principle that as regards
aliens, habeas jurisdiction exists only where the United States is sover-
eign.17 8 The administration argues that the United States is not sovereign
at Guantanamo Bay because the 1903 lease agreement between the two
countries declares that Cuba retains ultimate sovereignty. Some commen-
tators, however, argue that this is not the proper understanding of the
lease,179 and reading Rasul consistently with Eisentrager requires that
Guantanamo Bay be the functional equivalent of sovereign U.S.
territory. 180
Litigation currently in the federal courts is wrestling with these
issues.18 1 In 2005, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
held that Guantanamo Bay detainees had substantive Fifth Amendment
rights under the U.S. Constitution. 18 2 The district court's reasoning fol-
lowed Rasul: given the nature of the United States' presence in Guanta-
namo, and the fact that its activities there are immune from Cuban law,
Guantanamo Bay is the "equivalent of a U.S. territory in which fundamen-
Black stated, "[W]e reject the idea that when the United States acts against citizens
abroad it can do so free of the Bill of Rights. The United States is entirely a creature of
the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source .... When the Govern-
ment reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights
and other parts of the Constitution provide ... should not be stripped away just because
he happens to be in another land." Id. at 5-6.
176. See Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2524 ("It is difficult to discern a coherent underly-
ing theory that can both cast the Constitution as a document that controls the exercise
of government power wherever that power is exercised, while at the same time constru-
ing it as a document that limits those controls-which are facially-neutral as to citizen-
ship-only to citizens when power is exercised outside the territory of the United
States.").
177. Compare Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (stating that Guantanamo Bay is not the
United States' "ultimate" sovereign territory) with Raustiala supra note 4 at 2540-41
(arguing that the United States is only the temporary sovereign).
178. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
179. See Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2540-41 (arguing persuasively that a better read-
ing of the lease's key language, "ultimate sovereignty," indicates that Cuba holds a rever-
sionary right to Guantanamo Bay upon termination of the lease but until then the
United States is the temporary sovereign).
180. Some of the Guantanamo cases have held as much. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gherebi, 352
F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding U.S. naval base located in Cuba to be under com-
plete U.S. jurisdiction). See generally Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2534 (discussing the
ambiguous legal status of Guantanamo Bay as unsurprising given the century-long
exclusive control the United States has exerted over the territory).
181. Detainee cases at 443.
182. Id. (holding that CSRT procedures implemented by the government to determine
that an individual is an enemy combatant subject to indefinite detention violated peti-
tioners' due process rights).
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tal constitutional rights apply." 18 3 Alien detainees there are entitled to the
procedural equivalent to what they would enjoy if they were held within the
geographic boundaries of the United States, which is similar to that
enjoyed by U.S. citizens.1s 4 Indeed, Judge Green stated, "[Tlhere [is] noth-
ing impracticable [or] anomalous in recognizing that the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay have the fundamental right to due process of law under
the Fifth Amendment." 18 5
If Judge Green is correct, in the eyes of the Constitution, alien detain-
ees at Guantanamo Bay are, in certain relevant respects, indistinguishable
from citizen detainees, 18 6 whose detentions, the Court in Hamdi held, are
limited by the Constitution. 18 7 As the Rasul Court held, those detentions
"unquestionably describe 'custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States."'" 8 8 Thus, in the absence of due process,
the arbitrary and indefinite detentions at Guantanamo Bay are unconstitu-
tional, whether the person detained is a citizen or an alien.
The government's authority for the continued detentions of Guanta-
namo Bay detainees is their classification as enemy combatants. 18 9 The
Uighurs, almost all of whom have been processed and cleared for release
by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, 190 leave the government without
authority to detain them. The question, therefore, is whether the govern-
ment may indefinitely detain persons when it has no authority to do so.
1. Due Process
The Uighurs have received such process as is provided by the Combat-
ant Status Review Tribunals. 19 1 The CSRT determined that some of the
Uighurs were no longer considered enemy combatants, and cleared the
183. Id. at 464 ("American authorities are in full control at Guantanamo Bay, their
activities are immune from Cuban law, and there are few or no significant remnants of
native Cuban culture or tradition remaining that can interfere with the implementation
of an American system of justice.").
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. It should be noted that even within the United States aliens are not entitled to all
the constitutional rights that citizens are. See generally Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976) (describing constitutional rights that depend on citizenship status). But those
not available to aliens are the right to vote, run for certain elective offices, and the right
not to be deported. See generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REv. 953, 978
(2002) ("[R]elatively little turns on citizenship status. The right to vote and the right to
run for federal elective office are restricted to citizens, but all other rights are written
without such limitations.").
187. Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 533 ("[A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classifi-
cation as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classifica-
tion, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral
decision maker.").
188. Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 466 (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3) granting habeas to a
prisoner if he is in "custody in violation of the ... laws ... of the United States"').
189. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (2004).
190. Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198, 199.
191. The process provided by the CSRT was recently found inadequate. Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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remainder for release, 192 eliminating the U.S. government's legal justifica-
tion to detain them. What must be determined, therefore, is whether the
government may lawfully detain an alien whom the government has no
legal authority to hold. The first consideration is whether the Uighurs'
continued detention violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.
193
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the judicial opinion laying out the framework for
the CSRT proceedings, held that a U.S. citizen detained on the ground that
he is an enemy combatant is entitled to "notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."'1 9 4 Hamdi did not require that
the same process be granted to aliens. Dicta in Rasul v. Bush, however,
suggests that aliens are entitled to similar procedural requirements, 1 95
namely the right to counsel and the opportunity to be heard prior to the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.' 96 Regardless of whether these
procedures are mandatory in order to detain aliens at Guantanamo Bay
because the Uighurs were granted the minimum procedures laid out by
Hamdi, 197 this Note does not argue that they were denied procedural due
process.
Substantive due process, however, is another matter. The test for
determining procedures that are necessary to ensure due process of law
when there are strong, competing interests at stake is laid out in Mathews v.
Eldridge.198 The Mathews balancing test, which has been applied in other
Guantanamo detention cases, 19 9 dictates that the process due in a given
situation is determined by weighing the private interest affected by the gov-
ernment action in question and the risk of erroneously depriving that
interest against the government's interest in carrying out its action. 200 In
192. See Hood Declaration, supra note 13.
193. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part Ill, the District Court for the District
of Columbia held the Uighurs' detentions to be unlawful but did so by applying a
Zadvydas-like reasonableness standard for the duration of a removal period, analogizing
their case to that of removable or excludable aliens. See Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
It did not address issues of due process.
194. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
195. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (stating that the allegations of the Rasul peti-
tioners-that they have been denied access to counsel and have been held without
charge-"unquestionably describe[] 'custody in violation of the Constitution of the
United States"').
196. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) ("For more than a century the
central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must
first be notified."' (citations omitted)).
197. See Hood Declaration, supra note 13.
198. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
199. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-30; Detainee cases at 465.
200. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 ("First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail."). See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-30 (discussing the balancing
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determining the government's interest, consideration must be given to the
burden -financial, administrative, and otherwise -placed upon the govern-
ment if greater process were required.2 0 '
The Uighurs' interest affected by government action in this instance is,
as the Hamdi Court has described it, among "the most elemental of liberty
interests. 20 2 It is the interest in freedom from physical detention.
20 3
While Hamdi, a Guantanamo detention case applying the Mathews balanc-
ing test, involved the detention of a U.S. citizen rather than an alien, the
conditions of their detentions are otherwise quite similar.20 4 The Court's
approach to weighing the Mathews criteria thus provides a useful model for
applying the test to the Uighurs. In Handi, the Court stated that the poten-
tial duration of incarceration was a highly significant factor in weighing the
individual's interest.20 5 In the Uighurs' case, the government has declared
that it will detain the men for "as long as necessary ' ' 20 6 to tie up the admin-
istrative loose ends of its detentions, or to find a diplomatic solution to the
problem of what to do with the Uighurs. Given the results of the State
Department's efforts to relocate all but five of the Uighurs so far, there is
every reason to believe that such a diplomatic solution is not attainable.
20 7
Furthermore, in response to a similar question posed in Hamdi, the govern-
ment declared that it had the right to detain enemy combatants until the
war on terror was over, which, it said, could conceivably last "genera-
tions."20 8 "As long as necessary", therefore, may be a terrifically long time.
The government's stated interest is in "winding up" the Uighurs'
detentions in "an orderly fashion."'2 0 9 In other Guantanamo detention
cases, the government's interest has been in preventing the detainee from
returning to battle, 2 10 and strategic matters related to the conduct of war.
Here, the government's interest is essentially administrative. The district
court judge in Qassim's hearing, replying to the government's stated ratio-
nale, declared, "[tihere is no basis for this claimed authority except the
test applied and the criteria considered when assessing due process rights of a U.S.
citizen held outside the territorial borders of the United States).
201. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
202. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510-12.
203. The restraint in the Uighurs case is perhaps more egregious than that of
Hamdi's. The Uighurs' detentions, because known to be no longer necessary, are even
more offensive to a basic sense of justice. See id. (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 80 (1992) ("Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.")).
204. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529-30.
205. See id., 542 U.S. at 528-31.
206. See Transcript of Status Conference, supra note 44, at 18.
207. See id. At least 100 countries have been approached. To date, all 100 have
refused. See Mariner, supra note 16; Whitlock, supra note 9.
208. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
209. See Respondents Supplemental Memorandum Pursuant to the Court's Invitation
at 12, Qassim v. Bush, 382 F. Supp. 2d 126 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 05-0497JR) (citing as the
basis of its authority to continue detaining the Uighurs "the Executive's necessary power
to wind up wartime detentions in an orderly fashion") (on file with author).
210. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
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Executive's assertion of it."'2 1 1 It is unclear, therefore, whether this govern-
mental interest is legitimate; assuming it is, however, the weight of that
interest is relatively small compared to the substantial deprivations suf-
fered by the Uighurs over the last five years. 2 12 The harm to the Uighurs is
substantial. 2 13 It includes prolonged and indefinite detention under harsh
conditions; separation from their families; the prospect of statelessness
upon release; and finally, five years of incarceration without charge. 2 14 All
of these considerations weigh heavily in favor of the Uighurs' release. 2 15
Furthermore, unlike the German soldiers in Johnson v. Eisentrager,2 16 the
Uighurs, Chinese citizens, are not nationals of countries at war with the
United States. 2 17 While the Uighurs may have received training in Afghan-
istan in the use of small arms, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest
they intended or ever did intend to engage in acts of aggression against the
United States.2 18 The government has never convicted the Uighurs of
wrongdoing.
In striking a balance between these competing interests, a court must
give substantial deference to the government's interest in securing the
country's safety. 2 19 It is also compelled to heed the civil liberties our soci-
ety holds dear.2 20 Here, the government's interest is one of administration.
The government has not argued that the detention of the Uighurs remain-
ing in Guantanamo Bay is essential, or even helpful, in serving the interest
of national security. Nor has the government asserted that any harm
would come to the government's military operations overseas by releasing
the Uighurs. Thus, absent the government's advancement of a more com-
pelling justification for continuing to detain the Uighurs, 22 1 substantive
due process argues in favor of their release.
This result has been the fear of many critics of the Court's recent
detention decisions. 2 22 In the words of one commentator, the Court in
Rasul v. Bush leaped before it looked,2 2 3 creating a forum for alien detain-
211. Qassim, 382 F.Supp.2d 126, 128.
212. See Second Supplemental Memorandum of Petitioners in Support of Motion to
Vacate Stay Order and Issue Writ Directing Immediate Release of Petitioners and for
Other Relief at 1-3, Qassim v. Bush, 382 F.Supp.2d 126 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 05-0497JR)
(on file with author).
213. See id.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950).
217. See Hood Declaration, supra note 13, at 2.
218. See id.
219. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507, 533-534; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976).
220. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532 ("It is during our most challenging and uncertain
moments that our Nation's commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is
in those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for
which we fight abroad.").
221. The government has not suggested the Uighurs pose a threat of any kind. See
Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198, 201.
222. See, e.g., TERRORISM, supra note 3.
223. See Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 161.
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ees without providing a remedy, or even stating what source of law should
govern a federal court's decisions at Guantanamo Bay. 2 2 4 Implicitly, the
Rasul Court suggested that the U.S. Constitution provides the substantive
law governing Guantanamo Bay. 22 5 This result may not be as dire as
Wedgwood suggests. A theory of a global Constitution does not argue that
the Constitution is, without exception, universally applicable. Rather, the
assertion is that through balancing tests it is possible to determine which
provisions apply and where. As its proponents argue, the global Constitu-
tion would not require that "all rules apply identically in all places." 2 26
While the presumption would be for universal application, it may be desir-
able to limit the reach of a statute or provision. The point would be that
under this approach, "a justification [for the limitation] must be offered
and defended" before that limitation can be said to exist.
227
2. International Law
A second source of substantive law is international law, whether it is
under a treaty-an agreement, for example, such as the Geneva Conven-
tions or the Convention Against Torture, to which the United States is
bound as a party-or customary international law. In this part of the Note,
I suggest a potential argument for the unlawfulness of the Uighurs' indefi-
nite detentions under international law.
a) Treaty Law
The Fourth Geneva Convention 2 28 states that civilians detained dur-
ing wartime may be held only as long as detention is necessary, 2 29 thus
imposing a necessity requirement similar to that in the detention context
under U.S. domestic law.230 Leaving to one side the issue of the applicabil-
ity of the Conventions, 2 3 1 the Uighurs, because they are non-enemy com-
224. See id. at 163 ("[Plerhaps the most striking feature of the Court's ruling in Rasul
is that it decides upon a remedy without any serious examination of what law might be
applicable.").
225. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004).
226. Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2551. See also NFumAN, supra note 4, at 5.
227. Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2551.
228. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 132, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973.
229. See id. ("Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon
as the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.").
230. See supra text accompanying note 76.
231. There is substantial debate as to whether international conventions related to the
laws of war can and should be applied to the war on terror. The Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Hague Convention of 1907 were drafted with conventional, state-against-
state warfare in mind. Many commentators argue that the privileges and provisions of
international humanitarian law should not apply to a war against private actors who
themselves pay no heed to the rules of war. See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 7, at 165.
Furthermore, both the Geneva and Hague conventions limit who may claim rights under
them. The Geneva Conventions, for instance, are limited to the claims of citizens of
armed conflict between two or more "High Contracting Parties," or parties to the Con-
ventions. See id. This Note does not enter that debate. Rather, it assumes application of
the conventions for the sake of the discussion; the Note acknowledges, however, that this
assumption may loom large for some readers.
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batants detained during wartime, may plausibly argue that they fall within
the language of Article 132.232 Assuming that Guantanamo Bay detainees
are entitled to protection under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the
Uighurs' continued detentions violate the Convention because the reasons
necessitating detention no longer exist.2 33
The government, however, disputes whether the Geneva Conventions
apply at Guantanamo Bay. 23 4 It argues that the Conventions are not self-
executing, stating that they contain rights that cannot be asserted in the
absence of congressional legislation granting the rights under the Conven-
tions.23 5 Alternatively, the government argues that al Qaeda and other
international terrorist organizations are not parties to the Conventions and
thus do not have recognizable rights under them. 236 In Hamdan, the
Supreme Court resolved this issue to the contrary,2 3 7 as case law 23 8 and
scholarship support the position that the lack of implementing legislation
does not decide the issue.23 9 The government "has implemented the
Geneva Conventions for fifty years without questioning the absence of
implementing legislation;" 240 it did so, district court Judge Robertson con-
cluded, because "Congress clearly understood that the Conventions did
not require implementing legislation . . .and because nothing in the ...
Convention itself manifests the contracting parties' intention" that it
require such implementing legislation.2 4 1
232. This point assumes for the sake of argument the existence of only two categories:
enemy combatants and non-enemy combatants. In considering categorizations under
the Geneva Conventions, this seems fair; if the Uighurs do not warrant protection as
civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention, they would then be considered prisoners
of war, qualifying them for protection under the Third Geneva Convention.
233. The reasons necessitating the Uighurs' internment were their status as enemy
combatants; no other justification for holding them was proposed. Thus, their re-classi-
fication as NLECs, in the case of some of the Uighurs, and the fact that they have been
cleared for release in the case of others, renders the reasons for detention non-existent.
234. See, e.g., Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2749.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 2794 (holding that an alien could invoke the Geneva Conventions to
challenge procedures used by a military commission in his trial because the Geneva
Conventions are part of the law of war and that compliance with the law of war was a
condition on which courts-martial authority was granted).
238. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) ("The United States,
by the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929 ... concluded with forty-six other countries,
including the German Reich, an agreement upon the treatment to be accorded captives.
These [German] prisoners ... are entitled to its protection."); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344
F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2004).
239. For a discussion that the Conventions apply to the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan
see, e.g., Michael J.D. Sweeney, Detention at Guantanamo Bay: A Linguistic Challenge to
Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE, available at http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter03/
detention.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2007) ("All four 1949 Conventions apply during
times of international armed conflicts between states that are parties to them. Because
both the United States and Afghanistan are state parties to the 1949 Conventions and
because they are involved in armed conflict, the Conventions bind them .... The Con-
ventions construe the term 'armed conflict' broadly; they do not require a formal decla-
ration of war.").
240. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 165.
241. Id.
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Regarding the government's second argument, while it is unclear
whether members of al Qaeda and other non-state-linked international ter-
rorist organizations are entitled to protection under the Geneva Conven-
tions, 24 2 the Uighurs do not fall within such a grey area in the treaty
language. The Uighurs are within the scope of the Conventions because
they are citizens of China, a high-contracting part to the Geneva
Conventions. 2 4 3
The Uighurs, whether labeled civilians or combatants, are a class of
persons entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions, to which the
United States is party. In the civilian and military contexts, the Conven-
tions permit detentions only for as long as necessary to prevent a return to
the battlefield. Because the Uighurs' detentions are not necessary, they vio-
late the Conventions and, therefore, violate international law.
Alternatively, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), 24 4 a treaty generally interpreted to apply to all actions of a
state, 2 45 the indefinite detention of the Uighurs is a violation of interna-
tional law.2 46 The ICCPR, which the United States ratified in 1992, grants
the right to be free of arbitrary detention, detention without notice of
charges, and continued unlawful detention. 24 7 Where a person is under
the control of a state that is a party to the ICCPR, that person is entitled to
an adjudication of the reasons for the detention. 248 If the detention is
determined to be unlawful, the person must be released. 2 49 Therefore,
unlawful indefinite detention is a violation of the ICCPR.
242. See Robert Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of International Detainee
Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 712 (2006) (arguing that even as regards al Qaeda the
Conventions may apply because the conflict took place in Afghanistan, a high-con-
tracting party to the Conventions).
243. This comports with the government's rationale that members of the Taliban,
which the United States did not recognize as a legitimate government in Afghanistan,
were nevertheless entitled to protection under the Convention because Afghanistan was
a high-contracting party. See The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
The Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
244. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ICCPR], G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
245. See UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, 10, UN Doc. CCPR/
C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004) (stating that the ICCPR governs all extraterritorial
military action of a state party where any person is under the "effective control" of that
state party). ICCPR, supra note 244. Article 2(1) states: "Each State Party to the present
Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . ." (emphasis
added). Thus, rights granted under the ICCPR are not delimited by the geographical
boundaries of the contracting parties; instead, those rights are co-extensive with the par-
ties' exertion of jurisdiction and power.
246. ICCPR, supra note 244, art. 9(4). Art. 9(4) states: "Anyone who is deprived of
his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in
order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order
his release if the detention is not lawful."
247. Id. art. 9.
248. See id. art. 9(2); UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, supra note
245, 1 10.
249. See ICCPR, supra note 244, art. 9(2).
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b) Customary International Law
Despite arguments that "enemy combatants" have no cognizable
rights, 25 0 all human beings have protection under international law.251
Customary international law, the Supreme Court has said,2 52 can be
applied in U.S. courts in the absence of "controlling acts" by the political
branches. 25 3 Before a court may apply customary law, the court must first
determine if existing legislation or judicial opinion resolves the issue.25 4 If
neither offers guidance the court must then determine the content of cus-
tomary law, as shown by widespread practice among states, and general
acceptance that the practice is legally binding. 255
As the foregoing discussion indicates, multiple sources of substantive
law govern the legality of the Uighurs' indefinite detentions. Assuming for
the sake of argument that no binding statutory or judicial law resolves the
issue, courts must determine the content of customary law. In its analysis,
a court might look to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Univer-
sal Declaration") 25 6 as an embodiment of customary law. The Universal
Declaration is not a treaty, and no states are parties to it. Nevertheless, the
Universal Declaration is widely accepted as representing customary inter-
national law.2 5
7
Under Article 9 of the Universal Declaration, "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile." 25 8 Detention that extends
after an adjudicatory process has determined that the persons are free of
wrongdoing, and that continued detention no longer serves the purpose for
which they were originally detained, constitutes arbitrary detention.
Therefore, the Uighurs' continued detention is a violation of customary
international law.
250. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Rules of War Can't Protect Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2001, at All.
251. For instance, included among the jus cogens prohibitions is one against pro-
longed arbitrary detention. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 702(e) (1988). For a definition of jus cogens, see BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 876 (8th ed. 1999): "A mandatory or peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted."
252. The Paqueta Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
253. Id. at 700 ("[Wihere there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations .... Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of
their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what
the law really is.").
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
257. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004) (explaining that
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights does not, on its own, impose legally binding
obligations). But see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (arguing
that the Declaration on Human Rights is internationally accepted as customary law).
258. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 256.
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3. Case Law in Military and Immigration Contexts
Two final sources of law warrant examination because of their applica-
bility to the "wind up" rationale advanced by the government to justify the
continued detention of the Uighurs. An application of the principles
derived from the military and immigration detention contexts further
argues for the illegality of the Uighurs' indefinite detention. In Ex parte
Endo,25 9 the Supreme Court ruled that the Executive could not indefinitely
detain an internee after a review process determined that concerns regard-
ing her loyalty to the United States were unfounded.2 60 As discussed ear-
lier, Endo, a U.S. citizen of Japanese descent, was detained pursuant to
military orders following the attack on Pearl Harbor. 26 1 Following a
review of her internment, 262 which determined that Endo did not pose a
threat of espionage or sabotage, 2 63 Endo continued to be detained. 26 4 She
subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that she was being
unlawfully detained. 26 5
In ordering Endo's unconditional release, the Court interpreted the
legislation in a manner that survived a constitutional challenge, 266 holding
that the government agency did not have the authority to hold Endo after
her loyalty was established. 26 7 The Court declared that detention having
no relationship to furthering the war effort was impermissible. 268
The factual circumstances surrounding the Uighurs' detentions are, of
course, different than those in Endo.2 69 But one principle that applies gen-
erally to the detention power is that to the extent that such power derives
from a power to execute the war effort, the exercise of the detention power
should be limited to measures that effectuate the goals of that effort.270
Like Endo, the Uighurs have been cleared of wrongdoing; they have been
determined to pose no threat. No goal mandated to the Executive is being
served by their continued detention. Thus, because the continued deten-
tion of the Uighurs bears no relationship to any goal of the war on terror,
their continued detention is not authorized.
The legal significance of the category "No Longer Enemy Combatant"
259. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
260. See id. at 302. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the factual circumstances
surrounding Ms. Endo's detention.
261. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 284-85.
262. See supra note 99.
263. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 294-95.
264. See id. at 294.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 299-300.
267. See id. at 297.
268. Id. at 302.
269. See id. at 284-85 (noting the fact that Endo was a U.S. citizen and that her deten-
tion was on U.S. soil).
270. In other words, if the Executive's power to detain is rooted in an authorization to
combat terrorism, once the ends of combating terrorism are no longer met through the
means of detaining a certain individual, there is no longer any authority to continue
detaining that individual.
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is uncertain, 27 1 and the category's status must still be determined by a
court. Prior to the deportation to Albania of five of the Uighurs, their law-
yers sought asylum for their clients in the United States.27 2 One option for
the remaining Uighurs, therefore, is to allow immigration principles to
guide the court.2 7 3 Because the Uighurs do not fall within any of the immi-
gration categories justifying indefinite detention,2 74 immigration princi-
ples argue in favor of the Uighurs' release.
The Court in Zadvydas did not render unconstitutional all forms of
indefinite detention. 2 75 Instead, it read a removal-period provision in the
federal immigration statute276 to contain an implicit limitation, beyond
which the government may not detain an alien except in exigent circum-
stances. 27 7 Thus, the Constitution "limits an alien's post-removal-period
detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien's
removal from the United States," 278 unless exigent circumstances-a threat
of terror, for instance-compel a contrary decision.
In the case of the Uighurs, no exigent circumstances have been
advanced by the government to justify their continued detention. 27 9 In
such a situation, Zadvydas requires the court to make a reasonableness
determination regarding the foreseeability of an alien's removal. 280
Because after five years the removal of the remaining Uighurs is not likely
foreseeable, their detention, under the Zadvydas principle, is no longer
authorized, and they should be released. 28 ' In Clark v. Martinez,28 2 the
Court extended this logic to inadmissible aliens, arguing that because the
language of the statute does not distinguish between admitted and non-
admitted aliens, 283 the same limitations on the government's ability to
detain apply. Indefinite detention, arbitrary and untethered from any per-
missible goal, is not constitutional. 284
271. See Hood Declaration, supra note 13.
272. See Supplemental Memorandum, Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C.
2005) (No. 05-0497JR).
273. See supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of these principles.
274. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678.
275. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678; Aleinikoff, supra note 47, at 369.
276. INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (stating that an inadmissible alien ordered
removed "may be detained beyond the removal period").
277. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (suggesting that "terrorism or other special circum-
stances where special arrangements might be made for forms of preventive detention"
would warrant further consideration).
278. Id. at 689.
279. See Supplemental Memorandum at 200-201, Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d
198 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 05-0497JR); see also Hood Declaration, supra note 13.
280. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699-700.
281. See id.
282. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
283. See id. at 378 (noting that the pertinent language of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), "may
be detained beyond the removal period .... applies without differentiation to all three
categories of aliens that are its subject").
284. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997); Foucha v. Louisi-
ana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.
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The Uighurs do not fall within the exceptions carved out by the Court
in Zadvydas and Clark. They do not pose a threat and have not been
involved in terrorist activities. If the court considers them under principles
of immigration law, the Uighurs' continued detentions are a violation of
the law. Because it has been almost three years since they were cleared for
release, and because there is no diplomatic resolution to their predicament
in sight,285 the Uighurs' removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable under
the Zadvydas standard.
III. Moving Forward
When Judge James Robertson of the District Court for the District of
Columbia considered the Uighurs' case, he considered three options for
resolving their predicament. 28 6 The last of these three options, I argue,
offers the greatest possibility of striking the proper balance between the
interests involved. Before beginning that discussion, I briefly review the
two other options presented by the Uighurs' attorneys, as well as the
court's reasons for dismissing them.
The first option was to invoke habeas and order the government to
produce the petitioners in court for a hearing to evaluate the government's
security concerns and to set conditions for release on parole, until arrange-
ments could be made with a third country, under authority granting the
district court an "inherent power to grant relief pendente lite, to grant bail
or release pending determination of the merits."28 7 The court, however,
rejected this option because there were no material issues of fact regarding
the legality of the Uighurs' detentions, 28 8 and the habeas statute excludes
application of the writ when the application presents only issues of law.
The petitioners' second suggestion, which the court rejected at a prior
hearing, requested release of the Uighurs into the general population at
Guantanamo Bay, such that they would no longer be incarcerated in the
Guantanamo detention facilities. The court dismissed this as a remedy
both outside the reach of the court,28 9 and one that would not alleviate the
Uighurs' condition in any meaningful way. 290
The final option considered was simply to order the Uighurs' release,
forcing the government either to resolve the matter diplomatically or to
release the Uighurs into the United States until a permanent solution could
285. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Stay Order and
Issue Writ Directing Immediate Release of Petitioners and for Other Relief, Qassim v.
Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 05-0497JR).
286. Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
287. Baker v. Sard, 420 F.2d 1342, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
288. See Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 201 ("[T]here is no need for a hearing to resolve
factual issues relating to the legality of petitioners' detention, for the government con-
cedes that petitioners are [no longer enemy combatants].").
289. See id. at 202 ("Petitioners can cite no authority for the proposition that I can
order the military to allow a civilian, much less a foreign national, access to a military
base, and of course I cannot.").
290. See id.
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be devised. 29 1 In considering this option,29 2 Judge Robertson noted that
habeas is an expansive, equitable remedy.2 93 In Jones v. Cunningham,294
the Court observed that habeas is not fixed in its terms and has as its
"grand purpose ... the protection of individuals against erosion of their
right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their liberty. '29 5 Judge Rob-
ertson ultimately rejected this option because of the substantial "national
security and diplomatic implications" a release order would entail. Such
implications, Judge Robertson declared, were outside "the competence or
the authority of this Court."2 96
As Part II of this Note concluded, the United States cannot lawfully
detain the Uighurs arbitrarily and indefinitely. While the government has,
at least temporarily, disposed of five of the Uighurs, 29 7 it still must be
determined what the government should do with the seventeen Uighurs
cleared for release but remaining at Guantanamo Bay, when returning
them to the one country that is obliged to accept them, the country of their
citizenship, is not an option. Although the determination of what should
be done with the Uighurs must be guided by principles of law, a sense of
justice should inform the outcome as well. These men have passed the
fifth anniversary of their incarceration, despite never having been charged
with a crime, and despite evidence in some cases that these men were sim-
ply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Over three years after being
cleared of wrongdoing, 298 the Uighurs continue to be suspended in a legal
limbo of our making.
Judge Robertson's opinion came to the conclusion that although the
Uighurs' detentions are unlawful, the federal district court did not have
authority to alleviate the harshness of their conditions. 29 9 He did so under
the principles of separation of powers, believing that any order he might
give would have significant implications affecting matters best resolved by
the other branches of government. 30 0 Because the Uighurs are Chinese
nationals, Judge Robertson argued, a determination of their status must be
291. See id.
292. See id. at 202-203.
293. See id. at 202.
294. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
295. Id. at 243.
296. Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
297. See Konviser, supra note 16; Mariner, supra note 16.
298. See Second Supplemental Memorandum of Petitioners in Support of Motion to
Vacate Stay Order and Issue Writ Directing Immediate Release of Petitioners and for
Other Relief at 2, Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 05-0497JR).
The U.S. government has never disclosed the records of the CSRT, so it is not known
what conclusions it came to beyond its "No Longer Enemy Combatant" determination.
See id. at 3.
299. See Qassim at 202-203.
300. See id. (noting that decisions respecting admission of aliens into the United
States has long rested with the political branches and have consistently held to fall
"wholly outside the power of [courts] to control"); see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,
796 (1977).
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left to those political branches. 30 1 A court decision ordering the admission
of the Uighurs into the United States, or one laying out the specific terms
governing their release into the country, would certainly fall outside the
authority of the courts. However, a court order declaring simply that the
government may not detain the Uighurs beyond a period reasonable to
secure a diplomatic solution to their predicament would not reach so far.
Instead, such an order would allow the government a reasonable period of
time to resolve the matter diplomatically. If it could not do so, the govern-
ment would then bear the burden of crafting a satisfactory parole arrange-
ment under which the Uighurs would be permitted a degree of freedom
while the government labors to find a permanent and satisfactory solution
to their problem.
In the analogous situation of excludable aliens, 30 2 the court has a
workable solution that would resolve this issue in a manner that both
addresses the government's interests and reaches a just outcome for the
Uighurs. If the U.S. government grants the Uighurs limited relief in the
form of conditional entry, it could continue its resettlement efforts while
controlling the terms of their release. The Uighurs then would not bear the
burden of all the hardships of the government's mistakes in initially detain-
ing them and then continuing to detain them years after they had been
cleared for release. While the court itself does not have the authority to
order the entry under parole of an alien-this power, as Judge Robertson
noted, rests exclusively with the Executive branch-the Court could force
the government's hand by declaring the Uighurs' detentions unlawful,
which would in turn require the government to resolve the issue in a man-
ner within its power. In addition, the court should apply a reasonableness
standard to any efforts by the government to diplomatically resolve the
Uighurs' predicament. This is the same standard that applies to removable
aliens.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), 30 3 the Secretary of Homeland Secur-
ity may "parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions
as he may prescribe ...for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit any alien applying for admission. '30 4 A grant of parole,
however, is not equivalent to an admission of the alien into the United
States. When the Secretary of Homeland Security determines the stated
301. See Qassim at 203 ("These petitioners are Chinese nationals who received mili-
tary training in Afghanistan under the Taliban .... An order requiring their release into
the United States-even into some kind of parole 'bubble,' some legal-fictional status in
which they would be here but would not have been 'admitted'-would have national
security and diplomatic implications beyond the competence or authority of this
Court.").
302. The Uighurs' situation, while obviously distinct from the immigration cases dis-
cussed in this Note, see supra Part I.B. 1, parallels those cases in substantial ways as well.
Like the cases of removable and excludable aliens in Clark, 543 U.S. at 371, and
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 678, both of which applied a six-month presumptive limit to deten-
tion, the Uighurs' detentions stem from administrative efforts by the government to
secure their release.
303. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2000).
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purpose of the parole has been achieved-in this case, permitting the
Uighurs a degree of freedom while the government finds a permanent
home for them-the U.S. government returns the alien to the custody from
which he came. Therefore, the Secretary of Homeland Security could grant
the Uighurs parole but place conditions on this parole as the Secretary may
deem necessary. The Secretary may revoke the parole when the Depart-
ment believes the need for parole has passed (presumably, when a satisfac-
tory diplomatic solution materializes). This statutory solution would allow
the U.S. government to address any concerns it has until it can find a per-
manent solution in the form of any restrictions it deems advisable to place
on the parole.
Several members of a Uighur community near Washington, D.C., have
offered to provide food and shelter to the Uighurs pending their hear-
ing.30 5 Thus, if the government did grant the conditional release, the
Uighurs would have sponsors that could help assure their appearance at
court, as well as provide for them for the duration of their stay.
Neither the apparently temporary measure of shipping the Uighurs off
to Albania to relieve the pressure felt by the U.S. government nor continu-
ing to detain them behind razor wire at Guantanamo Bay is a satisfactory
solution. Furthermore, the Uighurs would seem to be eligible for asylum
or refugee status in a third-party country, given the nature of the Uighur
persecution in western China.30 6 Conditional release, therefore, would
almost certainly be a temporary measure. Thus, absent a stronger argu-
ment for the Uighurs' continued detention, the court should order the
Uighurs' indefinite detentions illegal, thereby pressuring the government to
grant them conditional release until a long-term solution can be reached.
Conclusion
Following the events of September 11, 2001, the clash between the
Executive and the Judiciary concerning how lawfully to conduct the war on
terror has challenged the Court to reach beyond limits it has traditionally
observed. Such an extension of the Judiciary's power is one aspect of a
broader untethering of power from geography. Rasul v. Bush, which
extended the reach of the Constitution into "unfamiliar territory," was a
decisive step in separating power from geography. Rasul has profound
implications both for the manner in which the government may lawfully
conduct the war on terror and for constitutional law generally.
The case of the Uighurs argues for a rethinking of the Constitution's
reach and the scope of its rights and protections. In a globalized world,
where a significant portion of the government's actions do not recognize
the physical borders of the United States, it is increasingly difficult to find a
rational justification that supports limiting the Constitution's geographical
reach. Such an understanding of the Constitution grows ever more arbi-
305. See Savage, supra note 24, at Al.
306. See Country Report China, supra note 39.
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trary and inadequate each day.30 7 More specifically, the Uighurs' case
presses the Court to respond in a way that other detainee cases do not.
Where other detainees-Hamdi, for instance3 0 -have disappeared without
charge or representation after years of detention by the U.S. government,
the Uighurs are not going away quietly. Given the increasing unlikelihood
of a State Department resolution, the courts may provide the only hope for
something approaching a just conclusion.
This paper has argued that following Rasul, the United States may not
indefinitely detain the Uighurs without lawful justification. Given the
peculiar nature of the United States's presence at Guantanamo Bay, the
unjustified indefinite detention of even a non-citizen captured and detained
abroad is contrary to due process. Furthermore, even absent the require-
ments of substantive due process the continued arbitrary detention of the
Uighurs is a violation of both international customary law and treaties to
which the United States is a party. Finally, this Note has suggested that in
the absence of a diplomatic solution, a federal court should order the
Uighurs' indefinite detentions unlawful. In thus pressing the government
to more urgently resolve the problem of the Uighurs, the court will con-
tinue to heed concerns regarding the separation of powers while creating a
more just and equitable distribution of the burdens of the Uighurs' unu-
sual predicament.
307. As framed by one commentator, the question that must be asked is: "Can the
United States, a nation committed to constitutional government-a 'government of laws,
and not of men'-in fact govern unfettered by its basic law as long as it acts outside
certain spaces?" Raustiala, supra note 4, at 2546.
308. See infra Part 1.B for a detailed discussion of the conditions surrounding Yaser
Hamdi's detention.
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